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Abstract—Accurate and robust disassembly of stripped bi-
naries is challenging. The root of the difficulty is that high-
level structures, such as instruction and function boundaries,
are absent in stripped binaries and must be recovered based
on incomplete information. Current disassembly approaches rely
on heuristics or simple pattern matching to approximate the
recovery, but these methods are often inaccurate and brittle,
especially across different compiler optimizations.
We present XDA, a transfer-learning-based disassembly
framework that learns different contextual dependencies present
in machine code and transfers this knowledge for accurate and
robust disassembly. We design a self-supervised learning task
motivated by masked Language Modeling to learn interactions
among byte sequences in binaries. The outputs from this task
are byte embeddings that encode sophisticated contextual depen-
dencies between input binaries’ byte tokens, which can then be
finetuned for downstream disassembly tasks.
We evaluate XDA’s performance on two disassembly tasks,
recovering function boundaries and assembly instructions, on a
collection of 3,121 binaries taken from SPEC CPU2017, SPEC
CPU2006, and the BAP corpus. The binaries are compiled by
GCC, ICC, and MSVC on x86/x64 Windows and Linux platforms
over 4 optimization levels. XDA achieves 99.0% and 99.7%
F1 score at recovering function boundaries and instructions,
respectively, surpassing the previous state-of-the-art on both
tasks. It also maintains speed on par with the fastest ML-based
approach and is up to 38× faster than hand-written disassemblers
like IDA Pro.
I. INTRODUCTION
Disassembly is the backbone of many binary analysis tasks,
such as malware analysis, reverse engineering, retrofitting
control-flow integrity defenses, binary rewriting, and binary
instrumentation [20], [40], [50], [51], [56]. Binary analysis
relies on disassembly to recover higher-level constructs such as
assembly instructions and function boundaries from machine
code.
Disassembly is difficult because high-level information from
symbol tables and source code are absent in stripped binaries.
This information is either discarded during compilation or
stripped before distribution to decrease program size or deter
reverse engineering. Therefore, disassemblers must approxi-
mate the recovery of higher-level constructs from incomplete
information. Complex assembly constructs such as inline data
and tail calls, further complicate disassembly.
Traditional approaches to this problem rely on hand-
crafted heuristics to guide the recovery, but these methods
are inaccurate and brittle [5], [7], [59]. For example, many
popular disassemblers, like IDA Pro and Ghidra, recover
∗Equal contribution, order decided by coin flip
assembly instructions by recursively following direct control
flow transfers (e.g., call 0x2ed4). Similarly, they recover
function boundaries by looking for known instruction patterns.
These heuristics-based methods are insufficient – prior research
has shown that IDA Pro misidentifies up to 58% of function
boundaries [7] and 4% of assembly instructions [4] in optimized
binaries. Furthermore, many heuristics for detecting functions
require continual manual maintenance of large databases to
adapt to code and compiler changes [7]: IDA Pro’s current
database for identifying common library functions is over 41MB
in size, and Ghidra’s is over 179MB.
Previous research has explored using Machine Learning
(ML) to address these challenges. The resulting models sur-
passed the accuracy of traditional disassemblers at both recov-
ering assembly instructions [59] and function boundaries [7],
[48], and are easier to maintain. However, current ML-based
approaches still face two critical challenges:
Accuracy. Recent research has shown that previous ML-based
methods are likely not as accurate as reported [5]. This is
because their accuracies were inadvertently measured on testing
data with significant overlap with training data, and therefore
their performance may not generalize to real-world binaries.
More concretely, Andriesse et al. [5] showed that the F1 score
of ByteWeight [7] degrades from the reported 97% to 65%
when evaluated on a dataset without overlap.
Robustness. The current most accurate ML approach for
recovering function boundaries, bidirectional Recurrent Neural
Net (bi-RNN) [48], is not robust to compiler optimization
changes (see Section VII-B). Similar concerns have also been
raised by Wang et al. [57], who proposed a more robust method
by combining ML with symbolic execution. However, this
method does not scale well to larger binaries.
In this paper, we present XDA (Xfer-learning DisAs-
sembler), a new ML-based disassembly framework that uses
transfer learning to address these challenges. We train and
evaluate XDA on 3,121 binaries, and separate the testing and
training data such that they have minimal overlap (less than
3%). We show that XDA outperforms all state-of-the-art tools
in accuracy at recovering function boundaries and assembly
instructions, and is robust to changes in compiler optimization.
Additionally, XDA’s speed is on par with the fastest tools.
Our key insight is to teach the ML model general depen-
dencies between bytes in machine code before training it to
perform specific disassembly tasks – we transfer its learned
knowledge of these byte dependencies to tackling disassembly.
Intuitively, we first teach our model to read and gain a basic
understanding of machine code and then teach it to solve a
disassembly task. We achieve this by splitting our training
into two stages, as shown in Figure 1. In the first stage, we
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Fig. 1. The workflow of XDA. We first pretrain the model with the masked LM task, and then finetune the pretrained model with new stacked NN layers for
disassembly tasks. Finetuning updates both the pretrained model and the stacked layers. During inference, the finetuned models takes the binary and output
disassembly information, depending on the finetuned tasks.
pretrain our model using masked Language Modeling (masked
LM) to teach it the byte dependencies of x86/x64 machine
code. In the second stage, we finetune our model to leverage its
knowledge of byte dependencies to solve a specific disassembly
task accurately and robustly.
The masked LM task asks the model to predict randomly
masked bytes, which requires the model to produce missing
bytes given the context. This design compels the model to learn
dependencies between the masked byte and surrounding bytes,
teaching the model a basic understanding of machine code
semantics. As we will show in Section VII, this understanding
improves not only the model’s accuracy but also its robustness
to compiler and optimization changes. In contrast, previous
ML approaches rely on superficial patterns, such as function
prologues, which limits their accuracy and robustness when
such patterns are absent or changed. An additional benefit is
that the masked byte prediction task does not require labeled
data. Therefore, XDA can be further trained and improved
using stripped binaries found in the wild.
We give some intuition on why the masked LM task is
helpful for disassembly. Consider a function that uses 0x28
bytes of stack space for local variables. To allocate this space,
the function uses sub rsp,0x28 to decrement the stack
register by 0x28 bytes. Now assume the byte 0x28 is masked,
like so: sub rsp,??. To predict the value of this masked byte,
our pretrained model learns to search for the corresponding
stack deallocation instruction (add rsp,0x28) and read
its value (see Section VIII-B for more details). Since stack
allocation/deallocation often occurs near the start/end of a
function, the knowledge of this dependency is a helpful
feature for identifying function boundaries. Such scenarios
that naturally occur in predicting randomly masked bytes, in
sum, teaches the model a powerful, general understanding of
machine code semantics that helps disassembly.
To evaluate XDA’s performance, we test it on 3,121
Linux and Windows x86/x64 binaries taken from the SPEC
CPU2017 [14], SPEC CPU2006 [15] benchmark suites and
the BAP corpus [7]. These binaries are compiled using the
GNU Compiler Collection (GCC), Intel C++ Compiler (ICC),
and Microsoft Visual C++ (MSVC) over 4 optimization
levels (O0-O3 for GCC and ICC, O1, O2, Od, Ox for
MSVC). We choose two popular disassembly tasks, recovering
function boundaries and assembly instructions, to test our
model’s performance, but XDA can be easily finetuned for
other disassembly and binary analysis tasks. Across these
binaries, XDA achieves 99% F1 score at recovering function
boundaries, 17.2% higher than the second-best tool. XDA also
achieves a 99.7% F1 score at recovering assembly instructions.
Furthermore, XDA’s underlying neural architecture is highly
parallelizable and efficient, running up to 38× faster than hand-
written disassemblers like IDA Pro.
We also evaluate the robustness of XDA to the changes of
compiler optimizations. XDA achieves at least 98.5% F1 score
at recovering function boundaries in highly optimized binaries,
even when it is only finetuned on unoptimized binaries.
We make the following contributions.
• We propose a new approach to disassembly using a
two-step transfer learning paradigm: we first pretrain
the model to teach it a basic understanding of machine
code, then finetune it to solve disassembly tasks.
• We demonstrate that masked LM is an effective
pretraining task for disassembly because it compels the
model to learn machine code semantics (Section III).
We then show how this semantic knowledge can be
leveraged in finetuning to accurately and robustly solve
two popular disassembly tasks, recovering function
boundaries and assembly instructions.
• We implement XDA and evaluate it on a collection
of x86/x64 binaries from the SPEC CPU2017, SPEC
CPU2006, and BAP dataset on both the Windows
and Linux platforms (Sections VI and VII). The
binaries are compiled by GCC, ICC, and MSVC
over 4 optimization levels. Even when the pretraining,
finetuning, and testing datasets are strictly separated,
XDA achieves an average F1 score of 99.0% at
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recovering function boundaries, outperforming the
state-of-the-art by 17.2%, and an average F1 score
of 99.7% at recovering assembly instructions. We
open-source our implementation at https://github.com/
forblinddoublereview/xda.
II. BACKGROUND
We briefly overview the two disassembly tasks we tackle,
recovering function boundaries and assembly instructions, two
fundamental building blocks in binary analysis research [4].
We then describe their challenges faced by existing tools using
real-world examples.
The definition of disassembly can be ambiguous, as some
authors refer only to the process of recovering instructions
from binaries [8], [36], [59]. We adopt the more inclusive
interpretation defined by Andriesse et al. [4], [5]: Disassembly
is the process of recovering higher-level program constructs
lost during compilation, such as assembly instructions, function
boundaries, function signatures, and control flow graphs.
Most disassembly tools recover these constructs via static
analysis, because dynamic analysis has large runtime overheads
and struggles to achieve high completeness in complex pro-
grams. Therefore, we also limit our methods to operate on
information acquirable without executing the program.
A. Recovering Function Boundaries
The task of recovering function boundaries consists of
identifying the matched start and end addresses of each function
in a stripped binary. We inherit the formal definition of this task
by Bao et al. [7]: given a binary that contains a set of functions
F = {f1, f2, ..., fn}, recover a set of function start and end
address pairs S = {(s1, e1), (s2, e2), ..., (sn, en)} such that for
all fi ∈ F, si is the address of the first byte of fi and ei marks
the end of fi (the first byte not contained in fi).
Recovering function boundaries from stripped binaries is
one of the most challenging disassembly tasks [4], [7], [18],
[26], [32], [48]–[50], [52], [55]. Functions are source-level
constructs but decay to simple control-flow transfer at the
machine code level, and symbol tables containing function
information are removed. Compiler optimizations exacerbate
the problem by removing indicative structures such as function
prologues. For disassemblers operating on recovered assembly
instructions instead of machine code, an additional concern
is functions whose instructions are not recovered cannot be
identified.
B. Recovering Assembly Instructions
The task of recovering assembly instructions consists of
identifying the bounds of each individual assembly instruction
within the code sections of a stripped binary.
The main difficulty of recovering assembly instructions
comes from distinguishing inline data from code via static
analysis [36]. Architectures like x86 and x64 have variable-
length instructions and do not make syntactic distinctions
between inline data and code [8], [59]. However, compilers
such as MSVC or 32-bit GCC1 interleave data with code for
1Originally, 32-bit x86 GCC interleaves data and code https://gcc.gnu.org/
legacy-ml/gcc/1998-04/msg00378.html.
code efficiency. In the worst case, the only difference between
data and code at the machine code level is that code bytes are
reachable at runtime. Therefore, perfectly recovering assembly
instructions from x86 and x64 binaries is undecidable [58],
[59]. Mistakenly parsing a data byte as the start of a multi-
byte instruction can desynchronize the disassembled instruction
stream alignment, propagating the error forward [4].
C. Challenging Cases
We use code snippets from Vim 8.2 compiled by MSVC
2019 to demonstrate some challenges faced by heuristic-based
approaches. This serves primarily as a motivating example. For
a more thorough listing of challenging disassembly cases, we
refer interested readers to Andriesse et al. [4].
Traditional disassemblers rely on heuristics to recover func-
tion boundaries and assembly instructions, requiring data such
as control flow information and function prologues/epilogues,
which restricts their accuracy and robustness. For example,
Figure 2 shows the linear disassembler objdump and the
recursive traversal disassembler Ghidra failing to disassemble
a section of code. objdump misinterpreted a jump table as
instructions, whereas Ghidra missed an entire function of code.
Similarly, in Figure 3 IDA Pro and bi-RNN fail to recognize a
function when the compiler optimization is increased, removing
the function prologue.
In contrast, XDA correctly recovers all instructions and
functions in this code. The key to this success is XDA’s
transfer learning approach, which enables it to capture general
patterns that match real program dependencies and semantics.
We provide the intuition behind this in the following section.
III. OVERVIEW OF OUR APPROACH
We have shown XDA’s workflow of pretraining and finetun-
ing in Figure 1. In this section, we describe how the pretraining
task, masked LM, compels the model to learn machine code
dependencies that could support many downstream disassembly
tasks. Although formally proving such claims remains an open
question [6], we sketch two intuitive cases below to motivate
why predicting masked bytes teaches the model machine code
semantics that helps disassembly. We include the more complete
details in Sections VIII-A.
Recall the definition of the masked LM pretraining task:
given a byte sequence, we mask out some random bytes,
and train the model to predict the masked bytes using the
non-masked bytes. The non-masked bytes are known as the
contextual information. We use two examples to show that
pretraining with masked LM allows a model to thoroughly
understand properties of machine code, aiding recovery of
function boundaries and assembly instructions.
Masking local variable allocation. Consider the code snip-
pet in Figure 3, where we mask four bytes (48 83 ec
28), representing sub rsp,0x28 that decrements the stack
pointer to allocate 40 bytes for local variables. Unlike the
example described in Section I, the model does not have
access to the corresponding stack deallocation instruction. We
found that our model still correctly predicts the four bytes
with high confidence, which implies the model understands
the semantics of stack allocation and can deduce the space
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......
f3	c3																	ret
90																				nop
77	33	13	00											uint	133377h
8b	33	13	00											uint	13338Bh
70	33	13	00											uint	133370h
......
cc																				int3			
48	8b	81	30	18	00	00		mov	rax,QWORD..
48	85	c0														test	rax,rax
......
Jump
Table
Function
Start
77	33			ja					0x1401333f9
13	00			adc				eax,DWORD	PTR	[rax]
8b	33			mov				esi,DWORD	PTR	[rbx]
13	00			adc				eax,DWORD	PTR	[rax]
70	33			jo					0x140133401
13	00			adc				eax,DWORD	PTR	[rax]
8b	33			mov				esi,DWORD	PTR	[rbx]
objdump	incorrectly
disassembles	as	code
48				??		48h		H
8b				??		8Bh
81				??		81h
30				??		30h		0
18				??		18h
00				??		00h
00				??		00h
Ghidra	fails	to
disassemble
Ground	truth
False	Positive
False	Negative
Fig. 2. Real-world example that fails objdump and Ghidra. The ground truth assembly instructions include (1) a jump table in the code section that objdump
cannot identify, and (2) a function reached via an indirect control flow transfer that Ghidra cannot statically determine.
......
40	55								push	rbp
57											push	rdi
41	56								push	r14
41	57								push	r15
48	83	EC	28		sub	rsp,0x28
......
Prologue
......
4C	8B	42	08		mov	r8,[rdx+8]
48	8B	02					mov	rax,[rdx]
......
No
Prologue
Compiled
in	O1
Compiled
in	O2
Increase
Optimization
Fig. 3. Both IDA Pro and bi-RNN recognized this function when it was not
optimized (O1), but failed to recognize it in higher optimization (O2) when
the function prologue is optimized away.
required by local variables by looking at the surrounding
bytes in the function body. Besides, the understanding of
such semantics can significantly help in recovering function
boundaries, because the function prologue strongly indicates a
function start. Section VII-E shows pretraining with such tasks
improves the results by 50% at recovering function boundaries.
Masking jump table entries. Now consider the jump table
example in Figure 2, where we mask out the jump table entry
77 33 13 00. We find that our model correctly predicts the
four bytes with high confidence, which indicates it learns to
distinguish inline data from code. For example, if it treats
the masked bytes as instructions (like those disassembled by
objdump shown on the right), it is highly unlikely for the model
to predict 77 33 (the ja instruction) right after the instructions
ret; nop. The reason is that compiler-generated byte code
(XDA’s training data) rarely places a conditional jump like ja,
which depends on flags set by cmp or test, after an nop.
Therefore, the model should understand the masked bytes are
part of the inline data section, which should be similar to the
following (as opposed to the preceding) bytes corresponding
to other jump table entries.
To confirm that the model is not simply memorizing the
byte order in Vim, we remove all Vim binaries (shown in
Figures 2 and 3) from the training set. Therefore, the model’s
high accuracy strongly indicates that the semantics described
above is captured in the pretraining process.
IV. THREAT MODEL
Robustness. We focus on binaries generated by standard
compilers. Like other disassemblers, we do not aim to be robust
in the presence of arbitrarily obfuscated code. Instead, we aim
to be robust against compiler changes, which often occur due
to improvements in optimization. In Section VII-B, we evaluate
the robustness of our model by testing it on binaries compiled
on higher optimization levels than the model is trained on.
False positives and negatives. Like most disassemblers, we
assume a small number of false positives and negatives can be
tolerated. Certain use cases in binary rewriting require recovered
instructions to contain strictly no false positives or no false
negatives; we do not enforce these requirements.
V. METHODOLOGY
We describe the design specifics of XDA, including the key
components of the architecture and workflow of pretraining
and finetuning. We then elaborate on the technical details in
the following subsections.
General design. Figure 4 shows the simplified architecture
of XDA and bi-RNN [48] and their example input-output. It
highlights XDA’s two key design differences with a typical ML-
based technique, bi-RNN [48]. The first is the employment of
a pretraining task. As discussed in Section III, this design
encourages the model to learn machine code contextual
dependencies helpful for many binary analysis tasks.
Second, we employ self-attention layers [54] in the model to
compute information flow between every pair of bytes. Specifi-
cally, we follow the encoder architecture in Transformer [54]
with several modifications (Section V-A). This design is shown
more capable than the sequential connections in RNNs in
capturing long-range dependencies between distant bytes. As
we will show in Section VIII, the model often needs to learn and
understand long-range dependencies in the binaries to recover
functions boundaries and instructions accurately.
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...x1 x2 xn
...
...
00
??
...
..
(1)	Pretrain	task:
masked	LM
(2)	Finetune	task:
recovering	function
55 ec8b
ff
...
..
Start
End
Neither
Masked
8b
Self-attention
(a) XDA architecture
...x1 x2 xn
...
...
55 ec
End-to-end	task:
recovering	function
8b
Start
End
Neither
(b) bi-RNN architecture [48]
Fig. 4. Architectural differences between XDA and bi-RNN used by Shin et
al. [48]. Two key distinguishing components of XDA are: (1) the pretraining
(masked LM) steps, and (2) self-attention connections between arbitrary tokens
instead of only between neighbors.
Input representation. Formally, we define the input x as a
sequence of byte tokens of size n: x ={0x00, ..., 0xff}n.
Each input byte xi ∈ x is represented as a one-hot encoded
vector (e.g., a3 is encoded as a 256-dimensional vector with
all 0s but single 1 at position 163). Besides 256 possible byte
values, the input vocabulary has 5 additional reserved tokens
(i.e., padding token <PAD>, start-of-sequence token <S> and
end-of-sequence </S>, unknown tokens <UNK>, and mask
tokens <MASK>). Also, note that here we do not put constraints
on n. For example, the byte sequences can span multiple binary
programs, or include only a subset of byte sequence within a
single binary.
Pretraining task. We pretrain the model using the masked
LM objective. Formally, for each byte sequence x1, ..., xn in a
given training set, we mask out some percentage of byte tokens
in each sequence randomly (see Section V-C for details). The
masked byte tokens are replaced by the mask tokens (<MASK>).
Let mask(xi) denote the output of applying the mask on
the i-th byte in x and mpos a set of masked byte’s positions
in x. The model to be pretrained, fp (p stands for pretraining),
will take as input the byte sequence with random bytes
masked: (x1, ...,mask(xi), ..., xn), i ∈ mpos, and predicts
the byte values of the masked tokens: {xˆi|i ∈ mpos} =
fp(x1, ...,mask(xi), ..., xn). Let fp be parameterized by θ
(fp(−; θ)), the objective of training fp is thus to search for θ
that minimizes the cross entropy loss (defined in Equation 1)
between the predicted masked bytes and the actual bytes. For
ease of exposition, we omit summation over all samples in the
training set.
argmin
θ
|mpos|∑
i=1
−xi log(xˆi) (1)
While the pretrained model’s input and output are one-hot
encoded byte tokens, all of its intermediate layers operate on
the embedding vectors. For each byte xi, let E1,i denote its
embedding after 1-st layer, the embeddings produced by the
l-th layer of the model is El = (El,1, ..., El,n). Let layer l
be the fp’s last layer; El is not the actual outputs of fp, as
fp will take El and stack a classification layer (e.g., softmax)
to predict the value of the byte tokens. Given the produced
embeddings El, we define finetuning tasks in the following.
Finetuning tasks. Given a sequence of embedding vectors
produced by the pretrained model El = (El,1, El,2, ..., El,n),
the corresponding ground truth y in our finetuning task is a
sequence of labels of same length n: {yi|yi ∈ Cy}n, where
Cy denote the set of all possible class labels of y. Each byte
embedding El,i will be mapped to a label yi.
Let ft denote the model to be finetuned. It takes as input
each byte embedding El,i, and predicts the label yˆi, where
yˆi = ft(El,i). Now let ft be parameterized by θ: ft(El,i; θ), the
objective of training ft is thus to search for θ that minimizes
the cross entropy between the predicted labels of all byte
embeddings and their actual labels:
argmin
θ
n∑
i=1
−yi log(yˆi) (2)
As both fp and ft in our setting are neural networks, solving
Equations 1 and 2 can be efficiently guided by gradient descent
via backpropagation. The gradient can flow through both θs in
fp and ft during finetuning, as fp is also part of the computation
of yˆ(i)j . Thus, the pretrained parameters in fp also get updated
during finetuning to adjust for specific downstream tasks.
As a concrete example, consider recovering function bound-
aries. The possible class labels Cy = {S,E,N} denote the
function start (S), end (E), and neither (N ). ft takes each byte
embedding as input and produces the probability distributions
of three possible labels, where the predicted label will be the
one with the highest probability. This is illustrated in Figure 4a.
A. Masked Language Model on Binaries
As illustrated in Figure 4a, the forward pass within the
XDA’s architecture consists of the following steps.
First, XDA embeds the one-hot vectors of each input byte
(both masked and not masked) as a fixed-dimension embedding
vector. What is not shown in Figure 4a is that XDA also
computes the positional embeddings, which encode the position
of each byte within the sequence as another vector that has the
same size with the byte embeddings. The rationale of using the
positional embeddings is to assign distinctive meanings to the
same byte tokens appearing in different locations within the
sequence. Note that in recurrent-based networks, such spacial
relationship is naturally encoded as the information flow follows
the order in the input sequence [54]. Two embeddings (i.e., byte
embeddings and positional embeddings) are then combined as
the actual embeddings of input for the next layer.
XDA employs multi-head self-attention to update the
embeddings. At each self-attention layer, each embedding
combines itself with a weighted sum of all other embeddings,
where the attention strength determines the weight.
Finally, XDA predicts the byte values of masked bytes
based on its updated embeddings in the last layer. To this end,
XDA stacks a 2-layer fully-connected network with the output
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dimension equal to the input vocabulary size. The updated
embedding here is known as contextualized embedding [17],
[34], [35], [41], [42] as it takes into account the information
of other byte tokens within the sequence.
In the following, we elaborate on the key concepts described
above. We will use the same notations defined in Section V
wherever they are applicable.
Byte position embeddings. The position of each input byte is
critical for inferring binary semantics. Unlike natural language,
where swapping two words can roughly preserve the same
semantic meaning, swapping two bytes can significantly change
the instructions. Therefore, we use the learned positional
embedding Epos (embedding matrix itself is learnable) and stack
a feedforward network F with one hidden layer to combine
Epos with byte embeddings Ebyte. Specifically, let Ebyte(x)
denote applying the embedding to the one-hot encoded byte
token xi, and let Epos(i) denote applying the learned positional
embedding to xi’s position i, we have:
E1,i = F (concat(Ebyte(xi), Epos(i))) (3)
As defined in Section V, E1,i here refers to the embedding
of xi in the 1st attention layer.
Multi-head self-attention. Given the embeddings of all bytes
in k-th layer, (Ek,1, ..., Ek,n), the core operations of a single at-
tention head in self-attention layer is to update each embedding
by the following steps.
First, each embedding Ek,i will get mapped to three
values following query-key-value computation: queryi =
fquery(Wquery;Ek,i), keyi = fkey(Wkey;Ek,i), valuei =
fvalue(Wvalue;Ek,i). Here fquery , fkey , and fvalue are affine
transformation functions (i.e., a fully-connected layer) parame-
terized by Wquery, Wkey , and Wvalue, respectively.
Each embedding Ek,i then computes attention score sij
with all other embeddings Ek,{j|j 6=i} by taking the dot product
between the Ek,i’s query queryi and Ek,j’s key keyj : sij =
queryi · keyj . Intuitively, attention scores s for all pairs will
end up as a square matrix, where each cell sij indicates how
much attention Ek,i should pay to Ek,j when updating itself.
We then divide every row of s by
√
demb (the dimension of
the embedding vectors) and scale it by softmax to ensure
them sum up to 1: s′ij =
exp(sij)∑n
j=1 exp(sij)
The scaled attention
score s′ij will be multiplied with valuej and summed up:
Ehk+1,i =
∑n
j=1 s
′
ijvj
Here h in Ehk+1,i denote the updated embeddings belong
to attention head h. Assume we have total H attention heads,
the updated embeddings will finally go through an 2-layer
feedforward network fout parameterized by Wout with skip
connections [27] to update embeddings from all heads:
Ek+1,i = fout(concat(E
0
k+1,i, ..., E
H
k+1,i);Wout) (4)
Contextualized embeddings. The multi-layer attention mech-
anism updates its embeddings iteratively up to the last layer.
The embeddings at each self-attention layer are known as
contextualized (or context-aware) embeddings. One significant
feature of contextualized embeddings is that the underlying
meaning of each embedding depends on the other tokens in
the input sequence. So the embeddings for the same byte token
can be different if the byte is in a different context (surrounded
by different bytes). This is in contrast with static embeddings
(e.g., word2vec [35]) commonly used by other related works
(e.g., learn binary embeddings [19], [21]), where a byte token
is always assigned to the same fixed embedding regardless of
the changed context (i.e., surrounding bytes).
B. Distilling the Learned Semantics
The examples in Section III motivate how pretraining on
masked LM task encourages learning semantics. However, they
are all implicitly embedded in the weight parameters of the
underlying neural network. To distill the learned semantics for
different downstream tasks, we leverage the contextualized
embeddings produced by the pretrained model’s last layer
and stack a simple 2-layer multi-layer perceptron (MLP) for
prediction. Explicitly, for each embedding El,i in the last layer,
we fix the network to perform the following computation:
MLP (El,i) = softmax(tanh(El,i ·W1) ·W2) (5)
Here W1 ∈ Rdemb×demb and W2 ∈ Rdemb×|Cy| where |Cy|
is the number of output classes (defined in Section V). Note
that we apply MLP to each byte embedding. Therefore, the
output of MLP is of shape Rn×|Cy|, where n is the length of
the input sequence.
C. Masking Input Bytes
For each input sequence in pretraining, we choose 20%
random bytes to mask. Among the chosen bytes, we select 50%
of them to be replaced by the special token <MASK>. For the
remaining 50% of the masked bytes, we replace with random
bytes in the vocabulary {0x00, ..., 0xff}. The reason of not
replacing all chosen bytes by <MASK> is that, in the finetuning
task, there is no such token. Therefore, we try to prevent the
model from discovering any spurious meanings of the <MASK>
token itself, but encourage the model to focus on using the
context to predict the masked tokens.
For the same input sequences at different epoch, we re-
randomize the bytes to mask instead of fixing the same set
of masked bytes throughout different epochs. Therefore, we
implement a dynamic masking scheme and do not apply
masking in the data preprocessing stage.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
We build the learning module of XDA in PyTorch 1.4.0
with CUDA 10.1 and CUDNN 7.6.3. We implement the self-
attention architecture using fairseq [39]. We run the training
and inference of our models on a Linux server running Ubuntu
18.04, with an Intel Xeon E5-2623 at 2.60GHz with 16 virtual
cores including hyperthreading, 256GB RAM, and 3 Nvidia
GTX 1080-Ti GPUs.
Datasets. Table I summarizes the datasets we use for training
and evaluating XDA. The first dataset is SPEC CPU2017 [15],
the updated version of SPEC CPU benchmarks. It includes
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TABLE I. GENERAL STATISTICS OF ALL BINARIES AND PERFORMANCE OF XDA ON ALL BINARIES (DISCUSSED IN SECTION VII-A). THE BYTE
SEQUENCES ARE OF LENGTH 512 (SEE APPENDIX SECTION A). WE USE 10% OF THE BINARIES FOR TRAINING (IN FINETUNING) ACROSS ALL DATASETS AND
THE CORRESPONDING TRAIN-TEST OVERLAP RATE IS SHOWN IN EACH ROW.
Dataset Total #
Binaries
Platform Compiler ISA # Binaries # Bytes # Byte
Sequences
Train-test
Overlap
SPEC
2017
588
Linux GCC-9.2 x86 120 198,019,576 386,757 0.001%
x64 224 464,906,401 908,021 0.2%
Windows MSVC-2019 x86 88 175,057,814 341,910 0.93%
x64 156 955,201,152 1,865,628 0.97%
SPEC
2006
333
Linux GCC-5.1.1 x86 90 55,637,428 108,667 0.002%
x64 95 74,006,029 144,543 0%
Windows MSVC-2019 x86 76 40,417,016 78,940 0.36%
x64 72 48,403,456 94,538 0.21%
BAP 2,200
Linux GCC-4.7.2 &
ICC-14.0.1
x86 1,032 138,547,936 270,602 1%
x64 1,032 145,544,012 284,266 1.1%
Windows MSVC-2010 &
2012 & 2013
x86 68 29,093,888 56,824 0.4%
x64 68 33,351,168 65,139 2.3%
39 C/C++/Fortran compute-intensive programs. Each program
is compiled using 2 compilers, GCC-9.2 and MSVC 2019 on
Linux and Windows, respectively. Each compiler compiles
the program on 2 ISAs (x86 and x64) with respective 4
optimization levels (e.g., O1, O2, Ox, Od for MSVC, and
O0-O3 for GCC/ICC). Due to various constraints (e.g., some
speed testing programs do not support x86, some compilers
cannot compile Fortran), we cannot compile all programs using
all optimization flags. In total, we have 588 compiled binaries
for SPEC CPU2017.
The second dataset is SPEC CPU2006 [15], the former
generation of SPEC benchmarks. It includes 19 C/C++/Fortran
programs. We follow the same configurations as Andriesse et
al. [4] to compile SPEC CPU2006 so that we can easily
obtain the ground truth for function and instruction boundaries.
For example, we use the legacy GCC-5.1.1 to compile on
Linux platforms. However, the Windows compilation and
configuration are not available and no longer maintained after
we have contacted the authors. Therefore, we use MSVC 2008
on a Windows XP virtual machine to compile the binaries
for the Windows platform. To compensate for relatively small
number of available binaries comparing to SPEC CPU2017, we
turn on one extra optimization flag in GCC (Os), just to enlarge
the pretraining dataset and introduce more byte patterns. As
the default installations of GCC-5.1.1 and MSVC 2008 cannot
compile certain legacy programs in SPEC CPU2006, we have
in total 333 compiled binaries.
The third dataset is from BAP corpora [7]. It includes 2,200
compiled binaries where 136 popular open-source programs
(e.g., vim) are on Windows platform, and the remaining
2,064 ELF binaries (from coreutils, binutils, and
findutils packages) are compiled on Linux platform. Both
sets are further divided equally into x86 and x64 binaries.
Baselines. We use IDA Pro v7.4 [47], Ghidra v9.1 [2], and
objdump as baselines. We also compare XDA with the other
two research prototypes that achieve state-of-the-art results on
recovering function boundaries. The first one is Nucleus [5],
which is based on the control-flow analysis. The second one is
from Shin et al. [48], who designed a bi-RNN [48] to recover
function boundaries. Since Shin et al. did not release their
source code, we re-implement bi-RNN in PyTorch following the
same setup described in their paper. Specifically, we adopt the
2-layer architecture with 16 hidden layer size, which reportedly
achieves the best result.
Label collection. We collect the ground truth labels for function
boundaries and assembly instructions using the debug symbols
and source code of the binaries. (1) To get function boundaries
for Windows binaries, we parse PDB files using Dia2dump [33].
For Linux binaries, we parse DWARF information using the
pyelftools [9]. Like Bao et al. [7] and many disassemblers, we
do not count thunks in Windows binaries and trampolines in
the .plt section of Linux binaries as functions. We remove
thunks and trampolines from the outputs of function recovery
tools that count them as functions, to ensure that they are
not inadvertently seen as false positives. (2) To get assembly
instructions, we collect instruction boundaries as our ground
truth, rather than the instructions themselves. This allows us
to modularize the design of our model. Given the instruction
boundaries, we can then deterministically map the bytes in
each boundary to their corresponding instruction. To collect
the instruction boundaries, we use source-level information to
guide a linear disassembler to get the labels for most bytes,
and then manually analyze the remaining bytes [4]. The linear
disassembler we use is the Capstone library [43].
Metrics. Both tasks (i.e., recovering functions and instructions)
have the imbalanced label problem. For example, the number of
function boundaries (both start and end) in the SPEC CPU2006
dataset accounts for only 1.05% of the total number of bytes.
A predictor that always outputs “not boundary” can achieve
a 98.95% accuracy. Therefore, we use alternative metrics,
described in the following.
Precision, recall, F1 score. We use precision (P ), recall (R),
and F1 score to measure the actual performance of XDA and all
other tools. Consider recovering function boundaries. Let TP
(true positive) denote the number of correctly predicted (e.g.,
function) boundaries, FP denote the number of incorrectly
predicted boundaries, FN denote the number of incorrectly
predicted not-boundaries, and TN denote the number of
correctly predicted non-boundaries. P = TP/(TP + FP ),
R = TP/(TP + FN), and F1 = 2 · P ·R/(P +R).
Perplexity. We use perplexity (PPL) to evaluate the masked
LM pretraining task, which intuitively measures how “confused”
the model is about the masked bytes being equal to the ground
7
truth bytes. The less confused is the model, the smaller the
perplexity. Specifically, PPL = 2−
1
N
∑
log(p(x)). Here p(x) is
the probability produced by the pretrained model on the masked
byte x of being the ground-truth byte value. The summation
applies to all the masked bytes. The smallest perplexity is thus
1 when the model is 100% certain p(x) = 1).
Train-test overlap rate. We use the train-test overlap rate
of the dataset to quantify the introduced learning difficulties.
The intuition is that it is easier for an ML model to achieve
good testing performance if the testing samples also appear
in the training set. We define the train-test overlap rate as
the percentage of overlapping byte sequences between testing
and training. Particularly, we measure the percentage of test
byte sequences that appear in the training set. This percentage
reflects how challenging the test set is, as the model cannot just
memorize all sequences for predicting the masked bytes [5].
Pretraining setup. To strictly separate the binaries used for
pretraining, finetuning, and testing, we pretrain XDA on pairs
of datasets shown in Table I, and finetune on the third dataset.
For example, all reported results of SPEC CPU2017 in Table II
are finetuned (detailed in the following) on the model pretrained
on SPEC CPU2006 and BAP.
Note that pretraining does not get access to any labeled
data of any downstream task (e.g., disassembled instructions
or function boundaries). Therefore, the common practice in
transfer learning is often to pretrain on large-scale corpora that
can potentially include the finetuning data (without labels) [16],
[17], [24], [44]. However, in our evaluation, we strictly keep all
pretraining, finetuning, and testing data separated to ensure that
no testing binaries in finetuning are shared across the training
dataset even though it is unfair to us.
We pretrain models for each dataset pairs (described above)
for 10 epochs. We hold out 4 binaries, each randomly selected
from Windows x86, Windows x64, Linux x86, and Linux x64,
respectively, as our validation set. We keep the pretrained model
weights that achieve the best validation PPL and load its copy
for finetuning experiment.
Finetuning setup. For finetuning each subset of binaries (i.e.,
in each row of Table I), we randomly choose only 10% of the
dataset as our training set and treat the remaining binaries as
the testing set. As opposed to the typical train-test split, where
the training set is often larger than the testing set, our setting
creates a very challenging scenario for ML. It increases the
possibility that a large portion of test byte sequences and their
underlying patterns do not appear in the training data.
As Andriesse et al. [5] argue, one limitation of the BAP
dataset is that duplicated functions are prevalent. Consequently,
high accuracy for recovering function boundaries (e.g., bi-
RNN [48]) can be trivial to achieve on the BAP dataset. Our
setting of using a small fraction of data as training mitigates
this issue. For example, in Table I, the highest train-test overlap
rate is not more than 3%. Besides, on other datasets (SPEC
CPU2017 and CPU2006) we have evaluated, the duplicated
functions are much less (we do not statically link the libraries
when compiling the program, and SPEC programs are collected
from diverse domains).
We run 30 epochs for both finetuning XDA and training
bi-RNN. We observe that XDA converges after 5 epochs of
finetuning, but we selected 30 epochs for a fair comparison
with bi-RNN, which often takes around 20 epochs to converge.
As Shin et al. [48] trains their model for 2 hours on a CPU,
another reason we choose 30 epochs to train bi-RNN is that
we find 30 training epochs consumes at least 2 hours on our
CPUs for all datasets.
VII. EVALUATION
Our evaluation aims to answer the following questions.
• RQ1: How accurate is XDA in recovering function
boundaries and instructions compared to other tools?
• RQ2: How robust is XDA under different platforms,
compilers, architectures, and optimizations, compared
to other tools?
• RQ3: How fast is XDA compared to other tools?
• RQ4: How efficient is XDA in terms of saving labeling
effort and training epochs compared to other tools?
• RQ5: How effective is pretraining, and how does it
help finetuning tasks?
A. RQ1: Accuracy
We first evaluate how accurate XDA is for the tasks of
recovering function boundaries and assembly instructions.
Overall result. Table II shows that, on average, XDA achieves
an F1 score of 99% on recovering function boundaries, 17.2%
better than the second-best tool, and 99.7% on recovering
assembly instructions, outperforming all other tools across all
platforms, ISAs, compilers, datasets, and number of training
and testing binaries.
We note that the linear disassembler objdump achieves a
high F1 score at recovering instructions. Even though it might
seem counter-intuitive, the high F1 score results from the fact
that objdump naively disassembles all bytes as code, making no
attempt to identify inline data. Since inline data only account for
a tiny fraction of bytes (usually <1%), simply disassembling
every byte as instruction is sufficient to achieve a high F1
score [4]. objdump achieves a perfect F1 score on binaries
compiled by GCC, because GCC does not generate inline data.
In other words, objdump cannot handle the hard cases, but
achieves a high F1 score because the hard cases are so rare.
To handle inline data, the recursive traversal disassemblers
IDA Pro and Ghidra act more conservatively, which sacrifice
their accuracy in easier cases and result in lower F1 scores.
In contrast, XDA can both identify inline data, such as jump
tables (see Section VIII for details), and maintain a high F1
score.
In Figure 5, we show in further detail that XDA outperforms
other tools by even greater margin at recovering function
boundaries, when tested on high optimization levels (O3 for
GCC and ICC; O2 for MSVC). While Shin et al. [48] (bi-RNN)
reports >95% F1 score in recovering function boundaries on
all metrics (precision, recall, and F1) on the BAP dataset, we
find that its performance is not as ideal in this setting (high
optimization levels, small training set and low train-test overlap
rate, and inclusion of other datasets such as SPEC CPU2017).
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TABLE II. RESULTS ON RECOVERING FUNCTION BOUNDARIES AVERAGED OVER ALL COMPILER OPTIMIZATION LEVELS. FOR RESULTS ON RECOVERING
INSTRUCTIONS, WE COMPUTE ON THE HIGHEST OPTIMIZATION LEVELS CONSIDERING LOWER OPTIMIZATION LEVELS ARE TOO SIMPLE FOR ALL TOOLS.
.
Dataset Platform ISA Recovering Function Boundaries F1 (%) Recovering Instructions F1 (%)
XDA Nucleus bi-RNN IDA Ghidra XDA bi-RNN IDA Ghidra objdump
SPEC
2017
Linux x86 98.4 55.4 79.9 91.8 89.0 99.9 87.1 95.9 94.6 100.0
†
x64 99.1 55.0 79.2 90.2 89.5 99.9 88.9 95.8 95.9 100.0†
Windows x86 99.1 60.8 73.8 67.6 70.4 99.2 82.3 96.7 92.1 99.3
x64 98.9 65.0 78.4 78.0 71.6 99.4 81.9 97.1 93.1 99.3
SPEC
2006
Linux x86 98.2 57.2 86.7 95.7 92.2 99.9 89.0 96.3 95.5 100.0
†
x64 98.7 56.8 73.8 92.8 92.0 99.8 85.9 96.4 94.9 100.0†
Windows x86 99.4 68.2 78.5 77.9 76.3 99.7 89.9 98.1 94.5 99.1
x64 98.3 56.8 72.7 90.1 86.2 99.4 86.2 97.9 95.7 99.4
BAP
Linux x86 99.5 61.5 74.1 59.0 57.2 N/A
∗ N/A∗ N/A∗ N/A∗ N/A∗
x64 98.7 53.5 79.0 58.3 56.5 N/A∗ N/A∗ N/A∗ N/A∗ N/A∗
Windows x86 99.5 69.0 80.1 89.9 87.0 N/A
∗ N/A∗ N/A∗ N/A∗ N/A∗
x64 99.4 70.0 81.4 90.5 80.6 N/A∗ N/A∗ N/A∗ N/A∗ N/A∗
Average 99.0 60.8 78.1 81.8 79.0 99.7 86.4 96.8 94.4 99.6
∗The BAP corpus does not contain source code and PDB files, which are necessary to obtain the assembly instruction ground truth.
†GCC does not generate inline data, so a simple linear disassembler can achieve 100% F1 score [4]. objdump always fails to identify inline data, but because
inline data makes up only a tiny fraction (<1%) of the code section, objdump’s overall F1 score is high.
XDA Nucleus bi-RNN IDA Ghidra
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Fig. 5. Precision, recall, and F1 score of recovering function boundaries by XDA and other tools on four types of binaries categorized by the platforms and
ISAs, on the highest compiler optimization levels.
We noticed that in our experiments Nucleus has a lower F1
score compared to its performance in [5], and worked with the
Nucleus team to investigate potential causes. With their help,
we found 3 types of function patterns prevalent in samples in
our datasets that Nucleus struggled to detect: functions ending
with tailjumps; functions with instructions after a return, that
are only reachable indirectly; and functions reached only via
jumps. These cases often cause compounding errors, where
failing to detect one function causes the tool to fail to detect
related functions. The findings are consistent with the analysis
of Nucleus error cases in [5]. We concur with the authors’
opinion that in some of these cases Nucleus’s predictions are
usable results for human analysts, despite differing from the
ground truth generated from symbolic information.
The lower F1 score is potentially caused by compiler
changes since the Nucleus tool was written, which increased
the use of the above function patterns, and the inclusion of ICC,
a compiler on which Nucleus was not previously tested. The
Nucleus team is working to analyze the issue more completely.
Generalizability. We test how XDA generalizes to unseen byte
sequences. Specifically, we vary the train-test overlap rate and
compare the test F1 score achieved by XDA and bi-RNN. We
use SPEC CPU2017 binaries compiled on Windows x64 with
optimization level Ox as our target for this test. As described in
TABLE III. F1 SCORE (%) OF XDA AND BI-RNN ON RECOVERING
FUNCTION BOUNDARIES ON VARYING TRAIN-TEST OVERLAP RATE.
Train-test Overlap Rate
20% 40% 60% 80%
bi-RNN 70.1 82.3 89.8 96.5
XDA 99.1 99.5 99.8 99.9
Section VI, we finetune on the model that has been pretrained
on SPEC CPU2016 and BAP corpus. We choose 4 target train-
test overlap rate (20%, 40%, 60%, and 80%). For each rate,
we select as the training set random sequences from the entire
testing sequences to construct the target train-test overlap rate.
Table III shows the testing F1 scores of both XDA and bi-
RNN with different train-test overlap rate. Note that in Table II,
XDA performs reasonably well on low train-test overlap rate
(<3%, see Table I). When we increased the train-test overlap
rate, we found that XDA still reaches a 99%+ F1 score after
finetuning for 30 epochs. However, bi-RNN obtains a high
F1 score only at a high train-test overlap rate (>80%). This
supports findings by Andriesse et al. [5] that the performance
of previous ML-based tools is biased. One possible explanation
is that bi-RNN relies heavily on memorizing syntactic function
boundary patterns, and it fails to generalize when the patterns
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TABLE IV. F1 SCORE OF XDA’S FUNCTION BOUNDARY RECOVERY
(PRETRAINED ON BAP AND SPEC CPU2006 AND FINETUNED ON SPEC
CPU2017 X64 BINARIES COMPILED ON LINUX WITH GCC) ON UNSEEN
BINARIES COLLECTED FROM POPULAR OPENSOURCE PROJECTS.
O0 O1 O2 O3
Curl 98.6 98.5 98.6 98.2
Diffutils 98.7 98.7 98.8 98.6
GMP 99.2 98.8 98.9 98.6
ImageMagick 98.4 98.3 98.2 98.2
Libmicrohttpd 98.9 98.8 98.9 98.7
LibTomCrypt 99.0 99.0 98.7 98.6
OpenSSL 98.4 98.3 98.4 98.2
PuTTy 98.3 98.3 98.2 98.1
SQLite 98.8 98.7 98.4 98.3
Zlib 98.9 98.9 99.0 98.8
are absent in the training set.
Generalizability to real-world software projects. Besides the
dataset in Table I, we also test the strict generalizability of XDA
on real-world datasets. In total, we collected 10 real-world
popular opensource real-world software projects, including
Curl-7.71.1, Diffutils-3.7, GMP-6.2.0, ImageMagick-7.0.10,
Libmicrohttpd-0.9.71, LibTomCrypt-1.18.2, OpenSSL-1.0.1f
and OpenSSL-1.0.1u, PuTTy-0.74, SQLite-3.34.0, and Zlib-
1.2.11. Note that we neither pretrain nor finetune XDA on
these software projects, but just use them to test how XDA
performs on the unseen binary programs. We thus compile them
using GCC-7.5 on Linux x64 with 4 optimizations (O0-O3).
Table IV shows the testing F1 score of each software project
and optimization achieved by the model pretrained on BAP
and SPEC CPU2006, and finetuned (in 30 epochs) on SPEC
CPU2017 x64 binaries compiled on Linux. We find that XDA
achieves at least 98.1 (and up to 99.1) F1 score at recovering
function boundaries even when none of these binaries are seen
during pretraining and finetuning, which is close to the average
performance that XDA obtains in Table II.
Tuning false positives/negatives. Some downstream binary
analysis tasks, which potentially use XDA as the building
block, are highly sensitive to false positives and negatives,
depending on their nature. For example, reverse engineering
malware can be intolerant of false negatives (e.g., the malicious
code is overlooked), while binary re-writer cannot afford false
positives (e.g., the data treated as code and getting re-written
corrupts the entire program).
While XDA achieves 99%+ F1 score, with only a minimal
number of false positives and negatives (Figure 5), we discuss
a possible mechanism to tune the false positives/negatives
to improve its practicality for diverse downstream tasks.
A common practice to control the tradeoff between false
positive/negative is to threshold the model’s output probability.
For example, we can predict a certain byte as a function
boundary only if the model’s output probability on that byte
is greater than a threshold. The model can thus be tuned to
act more conservatively/aggressively in predicting function
boundaries by varying the threshold.
Specifically, we use the ROC (Receiver Operating Charac-
teristics) curve and its AUC (Area Under the Curve) score to
quantify the trade-off between false positive/negative. Intuitively,
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Fig. 6. The ROC curve of XDA and bi-RNN, when finetuning and testing
on SPEC CPU2017 Windows x64 binaries compiled on Windows by MSVC.
ROC curve measures under different threshold (i.e., beyond
what confidence score does the model predict as boundary),
what is the model’s resulting false postive rate and false positive
rate. The higher the AUC score of the ROC curve, the better the
model. Therefore, given such curve, To tune the false positives,
we can (ideally) choose the threshold that achieves 0% false
positive rate with 100% true positive rate.
Figure 6 shows the ROC curves of XDA and bi-RNN,
when they are finetuned for 30 epochs and tested for recovering
function boundaries on SPEC CPU2017 Windows x64 binaries
compiled on Windows by MSVC. We find that XDA has
higher AUC score (0.994) than that of bi-RNN (0.9), which
indicates that XDA consistently outperforms bi-RNN on
different thresholds.
B. RQ2: Robustness
In this section, we analyze the robustness of XDA to high
compiler optimization. In Section VII-A, we can see that XDA
generalizes well across different platforms, compilers (different
platforms imply different compilers), and ISAs, but we have not
explicitly shown the robustness on different optimization levels.
For example, in Figure 5, we can only see XDA is robust to
binaries compiled with the highest optimization. However, we
have not seen whether XDA and other disassemblers can remain
robust under different optimizations. Therefore, we evaluate
the robustness of XDA under varying optimization levels and
compare them with bi-RNN.
Robustness to different optimizations. We deliberately chose
SPEC CPU2017 x64 binaries compiled on the Windows
platform as our target for this test, because these binaries
represent the hardest cases in our dataset for an ML model to
learn. First, it has less overlapping functions between training
and testing than BAP, so simple patterns seen in the training
data may not be useful [5]. Second, the function length in SPEC
CPU2017 is often very diverse, as opposed to the BAP dataset
that has mostly similar-length common library functions. Third,
we observe that MSVC uses inline data in the code section
for jump tables, while modern versions of GCC keep the code
and data separated [4]. Such features make it even harder for
recovering function boundaries, as inline data can disrupt the
patterns in the code. Finally, the total number of bytes in SPEC
CPU2017 is large (see Table I). Since we only keep 10% for
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Fig. 7. Comparison between XDA and bi-RNN on recovering function
boundaries with varying optimization levels (O1, O2, Ox, Od).
training, the large testing set makes it more challenging to
obtain good results. Similar to previous setting, the model to
be finetuned is pretrained on SPEC CPU2016 and BAP corpus.
We separate the binaries based on their optimization flags
(O1, O2, Od, Ox) and evaluate XDA’s performance of
recovering function boundaries. Figure 7 shows the testing F1
scores in 50 training epochs of both XDA and bi-RNN under
each optimization level. We find that XDA’s performance
remains robust under different optimization levels (>98.8%
F1), while bi-RNN performs worse on binaries with higher
optimization levels and remains at least 20% worse than XDA
on all optimization levels. In addition, impressively, XDA can
always reach a very high F1 score even after the first epoch,
while bi-RNN struggles in the first 30 epochs.
Transferability across optimization levels. The above exper-
iment tests XDA on different optimization levels, but it still
finetunes/trains on all optimization levels. In this experiment,
we test if finetuning XDA on only one optimization level can
still achieve a good F1 score on another optimization level. We
use the same dataset (SPEC CPU2017) and same pretrained
model (on SPEC CPU2006 and BAP) described above. We use
bi-RNN as the baseline.
Table V shows that XDA always achieves a 98.5%+
F1 score when finetuning on binaries with one optimization
level and testing on binaries with another optimization level.
However, bi-RNN has an apparent decrease in F1 scores when
the training and testing binaries are compiled in different
optimization levels. The excellent transferability of XDA
implies that the model learns machine code semantics that
is robust across different optimization levels.
Robustness to obfuscated binaries. We also checked how
XDA performs on obfuscated binaries, even when we do
not pretrain nor finetune XDA on any obfuscated binaries.
We obfuscate all our collected real-world software projects
TABLE V. TEST F1 SCORE (%) OF XDA AND BI-RNN TRAINED AND
TESTED ON DIFFERENT OPTIMIZATION FLAGS.
Train OPT
Test OPT
O1 O2 Od Ox
bi-RNN
O1 81 80 47 2.8
O2 44 85 81 75
Od 34.5 4.1 85.2 43.6
Ox 80 39 44 87
XDA
O1 99.8 98.6 98.8 98.5
O2 99.8 98.7 99 98.9
Od 99.6 98.5 99 98.7
Ox 99.7 98.7 98.8 98.9
TABLE VI. F1 SCORE OF XDA’S FUNCTION BOUNDARY RECOVERY ON
UNSEEN BINARIES OBFUSCATED WITH 5 DIFFERENT OBFUSCATION TYPES.
bcf cff ibr spl sub
Curl 98.3 98.5 98.6 98.5 99.0
Diffutils 98.6 98.7 98.4 98.7 99.1
GMP 99.0 98.9 98.9 98.5 99.2
ImageMagick 98.3 98.3 98.1 98.0 98.4
Libmicrohttpd 98.6 98.7 98.8 98.6 98.9
LibTomCrypt 98.7 98.6 98.7 98.6 98.9
OpenSSL 98.3 98.9 98.6 98.9 99.0
PuTTy 98.2 98.1 98.1 98.0 98.3
SQLite 98.7 98.6 98.1 98.4 98.8
Zlib 98.0 98.4 98.1 98.6 99.0
(described in Section VII-A) using 5 types of obfuscations
(OBF) by Hikari [64] on x64 – an obfuscator based on
clang-8. The obfuscation strategies include bogus control
flow (bcf), control flow flatening (cff), register-based indirect
branching (ibr), basic block splitting (spl), and instruction
substitution (sub). We turn off the compiler optimization in
case it optimizes away the obfuscated code. We then evaluate
the robustness of XDA on each of the software project shown
in Table IV obfuscated by each of the obfuscation types.
Table VI lists the F1 score achieved by XDA at recovering
function boundaries, with the same pretraining and finetuning
setup described in Section VII-A. We observe that XDA
remains robust for all obfuscated software projects, achieving
at least 98 and up to 99.2 F1 score. Notably, XDA performs
the best on the binaries obfuscated by instruction substitution
(sub), which is intuitive as such obfuscation only tampers with
the arithmetic operation [64] without affecting the function
prologues and epilogues Again, we neither pretrained nor
finetuned XDA on any obfuscated binaries. Indeed, in practice,
we can easily collect a large number of obfuscated binaries for
pretraining and finetuning. We thus expect that the model can
have even stronger results when it can learn the dependencies
between bytes in the obfuscated binaries.
C. RQ3: Execution Time
Comparison with other tools. We compare the speed of
recovering function boundaries between XDA and two well-
known manual-written disassemblers, IDA Pro and Ghidra.
Specifically, we choose 4 x64 binaries with different sizes in
SPEC CPU2017 compiled by MSVC with O2. We run both IDA
and Ghidra in command-line mode to eliminate the runtime
overhead of their GUIs. Table VII shows the time taken by
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TABLE VII. EXECUTION TIME OF XDA, IDA, AND GHIDRA (IN
SECONDS) ON BINARIES WITH DIFFERENT SIZE. WE ALSO SHOW THE
SPEEDUP ACHIEVED BY XDA OVER THE SECOND-FASTEST TOOL.
Binary Size
Speed
XDA
speedup
XDA XDA IDA Ghidra
GPU CPU
specrand_is 556K 1.6 12 4.8 16.4 3×
omnetpp_r 4.1M 3.5 29 92.3 146.3 26×
cpuxalan_r 7.8M 4.9 50.1 192.0 185.7 38×
blender_r 22.0M 16.1 136.0 317.1 246.2 15×
TABLE VIII. THE required number of training binaries and epochs BY
XDA AND BI-RNN TO SURPASS THE F1 SCORE THRESHOLDS.
F1 score threshold
> 0.9 > 0.7 > 0.5 > 0.3 > 0.1
# training
binaries
bi-RNN N/A 8 4 1 1
XDA 2 1 1 1 1
# training
epochs
bi-RNN N/A 28 24 14 13
XDA 2 2 1 1 1
each tool to recover the function boundaries from a binary.
XDA outperforms both IDA and Ghidra by up to 38×.
GPU vs. CPU. We compare the speed of XDA running on
CPUs versus on GPUs. Since XDA’s architecture (i.e., self-
attention layers) can be significantly accelerated by GPUs, its
inference time on CPU is up to 10× slower than on a GPU.
However, as seen in Table VII, XDA on CPU still typically
outperforms IDA and Ghidra by up to 3×.
D. RQ4: Training Efficiency
In this section, we aim to quantify the training efficiency
of XDA in comparison with other ML-based tools. Intuitively,
since pretraining has already encoded rich knowledge useful
for downstream tasks, XDA only requires a small amount of
the labeled data and training epochs for finetuning to achieve
good results on downstream tasks. In particular, we compare
XDA with bi-RNN at recovering function boundaries, on (1)
the number of labeled training data required to achieve certain
F1 scores, and (2) the number of training epochs needed to
achieve specific F1 scores, using the same training data. We use
Windows x64 SPEC CPU2017 binaries compiled by MSVC
with all 4 optimizations as our dataset. We base the finetuning
on the pretrained model on SPEC CPU2006 and BAP.
Labeled training data. We test if XDA requires less training
data than bi-RNN to achieve a comparable F1 score. To control
the number of labeled training data, we sort the binaries by
their size and start with training on the largest binary. Then
we gradually increase the number of training binaries (e.g., the
second largest, and so on) until the testing F1 score surpasses a
chosen threshold. We choose the last half of the sorted binaries
as the test set. We choose five F1 score thresholds (0.9, 0.7, 0.5,
0.3, 0.1), and test how many training binaries are required for
both XDA and bi-RNN to go beyond these chosen thresholds.
We train both models for 30 epochs.
The upper two rows of Table VIII shows that XDA always
needs only 1 training binary to surpass 0.7 testing F1 score
while 2 binaries to go above 0.9. However, bi-RNN needs at
least 8 training binaries to obtain better than 0.7 F1 score.
Moreover, it cannot go beyond 0.9, even if it uses up all the
remaining 78 training binaries (total 156 binaries except half
used for testing).
Training epochs. Now we test if XDA can be trained in less
training epochs than bi-RNN to achieve comparable F1 score.
Following the above setup, we keep only the largest binary as
the training file and take the last half of the sorted binaries as
the testing set. We then show the number of required training
epochs F1 score in Table VIII (lower two rows) to surpass
the same chosen testing threshold defined above. We observe
that the number of training epochs required by XDA is much
less than bi-RNN. For example, XDA needs at most 2 training
epochs to surpass all F1 thresholds, while bi-RNN takes 28
epochs to go beyond 0.7.
E. RQ5: Pretraining Effectiveness
Pretraining robustness. We first evaluate the robustness of
XDA’s pretraining task, where we test if XDA could transfer
the learned knowledge on one platform/compiler/architecture to
another for the masked LM task. The rationale is that the
compiler idiom varies significantly between platforms and
architectures (e.g., calling conventions), generating completely
different binaries. Therefore, if the pretrained model on all
binaries can generalize to different compiler configurations and
instruction sets, we can use a single pretrained model for all
downstream tasks instead of pretraining on a specific dataset
every time for each finetuning task.
Note that in previous experiments, we pretrained multiple
models with different dataset partitions to strictly separate the
pretraining and finetuning data (see Section VI) just for the
fair comparison with other baselines. However, in practice, we
can always collect a large corpus of binaries in the wild for
pretraining, and always reuse the same pretrained model for
finetuning on different labeled datasets. Pretraining can thus
be a one-time cost.2
We combine all datasets in Table I, and pretrain 5 different
models where their training data is partitioned based on the
platforms/compilers or ISAs. Specifically, we pretrain models
on (1) all binaries, (2) all Linux x86 binaries, (3) all Linux x64
binaries, (4) all Windows x86 binaries, and (5) all Windows x64
binaries. We leave 4 programs from SPEC CPU2017 dataset
out as the test binaries, each from one platform (Windows and
Linux) and one ISA (x86 and x64). To test pretrained models
on all binaries, we combine all 4 programs as the test set.
Table IX shows the test PPL XDA achieves after 10 epochs
of pretraining. When pretrained on all binaries (first row), its
PPL drops to at least 1.56.3 We also test the generalizability of
the pretrained model across different platforms and ISAs. We
note that XDA also performs reasonably well across binaries.
For example, PPL can drop to 2.5 when training on Windows
x86 but testing on Linux x64, which is far below that of
random guessing (e.g., 2− log(1/256) = 256). More importantly,
pretraining on all binaries (Table IX first row) has obtained the
best PPL to all platforms and ISAs (only worse than the cases
where training and testing are from the same platforms and
ISAs), because its training data includes all type of binaries.
2We study how results in Table II can be further improved if we pretrain
on all available datasets in Appendix Section C.
3The best PPL so far on natural language is around 3.6 [31]
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TABLE IX. TEST PPL OF PRETRAINED MODELS. WE ALSO INCLUDE
CROSS-DATASET PPL (e.g., TRAIN ON X86 AND TEST ON X64).
Training
Testing
All
Linux x86
GCC/ICC
Linux x64
GCC/ICC
Win x86
MSVC
Win x64
MSVC
All 1.41 1.56 1.25 1.45 1.26
Linux x86
GCC/ICC
2.26 1.55 2.31 2.14 2.88
Linux x64
GCC/ICC
2.41 2.57 1.25 3.03 2.25
Win x86
MSVC
2.26 2.26 2.5 1.44 2.7
Win x64
MSVC
1.98 2.72 2.02 2.5 1.26
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Finetuning epochs
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Fig. 8. Comparison of testing F1 score on recovering function boundaries
between (1) with 100% pretraining data, (2) with 66% pretraining data, (3)
with 33% pretraining data, (4) without pretraining, and (5) bi-RNN.
Benefit of pretraining. We quantify how much pretraining can
improve the finetuning tasks. Specifically, we test performance
of recovering function boundaries on SPEC CPU2017 Windows
x64 binaries compiled by MSVC (using 10% random binary
as the training set). We compare XDA’s F1 scores achieved
by varying pretraining data size. We compare pretrained model
on (1) 100% of pretraining data (i.e., on SPEC CPU2006 and
BAP), (2) 75% of pretraining data, (3) 50% of pretraining data,
(4) 25% of pretraining data, and (5) without pretraining. We
also include the F1 scores of bi-RNN for comparison.
Figure 8 shows that pretraining helps greatly in improving
the F1 score of recovering function boundaries. The model
always reaches >94% F1 score within the first epoch, e.g., even
when the model is pretrained on only 25% of pretraining data.
With more epochs of finetuning, they can always reach >98%
F1 scores. Besides, the more pretraining data, the better the
finetuning performance. Without pretraining, XDA’s F1 scores
gradually converges to 90% after 28 epochs and are lower than
bi-RNN in first 14 epochs. One possible reason is that the
underlying model of XDA has many trainable parameters (see
Section V-A and Appendix Section A), which requires more
training epochs and data than bi-RNN.
Pretraining other neural architectures. In theory, any neural
net architecture can be pretrained, including our bi-RNN
baseline. In this paper, we specifically pretrained on the
Transformer architecture, as its self-attention layers are known
0:		48	8b	7b	10													mov				rdi,QWORD	PTR	[rbx+0x10]
4:		48	3b	3d	49	9f	9b	00				cmp				rdi,QWORD	PTR	[rip+0x9b9f49]
b:		74	42																			je					0x4f
...
34:	e8	02	b3	d5	ff										call			0xffffffffffd5b33b
39:	4c	8b	c8																mov				r9,rax
3c:	4c	8b	c3																mov				r8,rbx
3f:	48	8b	d7																mov				rdx,rdi
42:	b9	96	00	00	00										mov				ecx,0x96
47:	e8	6c	17	d6	ff										call			0xffffffffffd617b8
...
59:	48	83	c4	20													add				rsp,0x20
5d:	5e																						pop				rsi
5e:	c3																						ret
5f:	cc																						int3
Pos Top	1 Top	2
0x3f 48	(97%) 49	(2%)
0x40 8b	(95%) 89	(1%)
0x41 d7	(73%) d6	(20%)
XDA	prediction
Fig. 9. We mask 48 8b d7 , one of the argument-passing instructions
of the function call at 0x47. XDA’s top-2 predictions with confidence are
shown on the right-hand side. We highlight byte c3 , as predicting the masked
bytes requires distinguishing the meaning of c3, which can be both ret or a
register depending on the context. We highlight register rdi where XDA
likely leverages to predict rdi in the masked bytes.
to be amenable to parallelization using GPUs, supporting
scalable pretraining. In comparison, recurrent neural network,
such as bi-RNN, is known for its limited scalability (due to its
sequential nature) on longer sequences and larger datasets [54].
Therefore, given the scale of our pretraining dataset (over 5
gigabytes), training bi-RNN is prohibitively expensive (e.g.,
our tests show bi-RNN is 100× slower than the Transformer
training on the same amount of data), so we omit pretraining
bi-RNN in this paper.
VIII. CASE STUDIES
We show some concrete examples to demonstrate that
XDA learns various byte dependencies and semantics. We
also illustrate the attentions of XDA when making predictions
to help explain XDA’s decision process.
A. Probing Learned Semantics
Predicting instructions. Consider the byte sequence shown
in Figure 9, taken from the SPEC CPU2017 sgcc compiled
by MSVC x64 with O2. We mask out the bytes of whole
instruction at 0x3f and feed the sequence to XDA to predict
the masked bytes. We find that XDA can recover the correct
bytes with high confidence (i.e., >70%). We make following
two interesting observations. These observations further justifies
the usefulness of pretraining in helping recovering assmebly
instructionsa and function boundaries.
XDA learns calling convention. As the masked instruction
belong to the argument passing procedures, correctly predicting
the exact instructions implies that XDA understands the calling
conventions of Windows x64 (i.e., saving arguments to the
registers in the order of r9 r8 rdx rcx [45]). We can see
that XDA is very confident that the first two bytes are 48 8b
(which translates to mov rdx,-), as it has seen the r9 r8
appeared before and ecx (lower 32-bit of rcx). In contrast, it
is less certain on the third byte, as moving which register’s value
to rdx is harder to infer. Therefore, we see 73% confidence
of d7, which will be decoded as rdi, while 20% confidence
of d6, which will be decoded as rsi.
XDA learns instruction semantics. Note that the highlighted
c3 in the byte sequence have completely different meanings
depending on the context. Recall that the input to XDA is only
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...
54:	48	8b	5c	24	38										mov				rbx,QWORD	PTR	[rsp+0x38]
59:	48	83	c4	20													add				rsp,0x20
5d:	5e																						pop				rsi
5e:	c3																						ret
5f:	cc																						int3
60:	cc																						int3
...
...
82:	cc																						int3
83:	cc																						int3
84:	48	89	5c	24	08										mov				QWORD	PTR	[rsp+0x8],rbx
89:	48	89	74	24	10										mov				QWORD	PTR	[rsp+0x10],rsi
8e:	57																						push			rdi
Pos Top	1 Top	2
0x5f cc	(37%) 48	(32%)
0x60 cc	(57%) 8b	(12%)
... ... ...
0x82 cc	(95%) 00	(2%)
0x83 cc	(99%) 00	(1%)
XDA	prediction
Fig. 10. We mask a sequence of padding bytes cc , which reside between
two functions. We highlight the typical function prologue/epilogue that XDA
leverages to make predictions for the masked bytes.
the plain byte sequence. As c3 itself denote ret instruction,
If XDA mistakenly treat c3 at location 0x3d as ret, the next
most likely bytes would be a sequence of padding bytes cc
that usually lie between functions for alignment. Therefore, the
only explanation is XDA implicitly learns that c3 at location
0x3d is part of another instruction.
Predicting the gaps between functions. Consider the same
binary (SPEC CPU2017 sgcc program compiled by MSVC
x64 with O2 optimization level), where we feed a different byte
sequence, as shown in Figure 10, to XDA. We mask out all
the padding bytes cc between two functions. The byte before
the first cc is a function end at 0x5e, and byte after the last
cc is the function start at 0x84.
We can see that XDA predicts all the masked bytes correctly
in the right-hand table. As the model cannot leverage any
patterns of padding between functions (we have masked out
all cc), the only context left for XDA to correctly predict
the masked bytes are the function epilogue at 0x5d (pop
rsi) to 0x5e (ret), and the following likely function
prologue at 0x84 (mov QWORD PTR [rsp+0x8],rbx) to
0x8e (push rdi). As XDA only sees byte sequences, we
speculate that XDA must understand that the corresponding
bytes before/after the masked bytes represent the function
epilogue/prologue, in order to predict those masked bytes are
padding. We thus perform a sanity check to ask XDA to predict
the function boundary. This time we load the finetuned XDA
and feed the same byte sequence without masking and ask the
finetuned model to predict the function boundaries. XDA then
predicts that there is a function end at 0x5f and a function
start at 0x84, which match the ground truth. We thus conclude
that the task of predicting masked bytes can effectively help
the model to recover function boundaries.
Predicting jump table entries. Consider the vim compiled
by Visual Studio x64 with O1 optimization level shown in
Figure 11, where we mask out one jump table entry. We can
see that XDA correctly predicts all the masked bytes in the
jump table with high confidence. More interestingly, we find
that while XDA can predict the least significant byte of the
jump target (the left-most byte in the jump table entry), it is less
confident than predicting other bytes. As the least significant
byte is the finest-grained byte the determines the address of the
jump target, it is understandable that it is extremely difficult
to guess. Moreover, XDA predicts 8b as the second possible
candidate byte after 77, as 8b appears twice in the context
...
13:	74	0a																			je					0x1f
15:	41	80	3b	75													cmp				BYTE	PTR	[r11],0x75
19:	0f	94	c2																sete			dl
1c:	41	89	11																mov				DWORD	PTR	[r9],edx
1f:	f3	c3																			repz	ret
21:	90																						nop
22:	77	33	13	00													uint		133377h
26:	8b	33	13	00													uint		13338Bh
2a:	70	33	13	00													uint		133370h
2e:	8b	33	13	00													uint		13338Bh
Pos Top	1 Top	2
0xc4 77	(46%) 8b	(44%)
0xc5 33	(99%) 32	(1%)
0xc6 13	(99%) 00	(1%)
0xc7 00	(99%) ff	(1%)
XDA	prediction
Fig. 11. We mask a jump table entry which consists of 4
bytes 77 33 13 00 . We highlight the function epilogue and other
jump table entries in the context that help XDA to guess the masked bytes.
0:		40	55																			rex	push	rbp
2:		57																						push			rdi
3:		41	56																			push			r14
5:		41	57																			push			r15
7:		48	83	ec	28													sub				rsp,0x28
b:		b8	61	64	00	00										mov				eax,0x6461
10:	41	8b	e9																mov				ebp,r9d
...
21:	48	8b	c2																mov				rax,rdx
24:	48	83	c4	28													add				rsp,0x28
28:	41	5f																			pop				r15
2a:	41	5e																			pop				r14
2c:	5f																						pop				rdi
2d:	5d																						pop				rbp
2e:	c3																						ret
Pos Top	1 Top	2
0xc4 48	(99%) 83	(44%)
0xc5 83	(99%) ec	(1%)
0xc6 ec	(99%) c4	(1%)
0xc7 28	(99%) 30	(1%)
XDA	prediction
Fig. 12. We mask the instruction that adjust the stack pointer to allocate
0x28 (30) bytes on stack for storing the local variable. It consists of 4 bytes
48 83 ec 28 . We mark the instruction that increases the stack pointer
to free the local variable that XDA leverages to make predictions.
in other jump table entries. This indicates XDA still leverage
the pattern as an important hint, but it is not dominated by
only pattern matching because it still predicts 77 as the most
probable byte.
Predicting local variable allocation size. Consider vim com-
piled on Windows x64 by Visual Studio with O1 optimization
level shown in Figure 12, where we mask out the instruction of
decreasing the stack pointer rsp to allocate 40 bytes (0x28)
space for local variables. At position 0x24, we can see the
corresponding instruction (add rsp, 0x28) that increases
the stack pointer to free the space. While the instruction of
increasing and decreasing stack pointer are similar with only the
third byte (ec and c4, respectively) different, XDA predicts
the masked third byte to be ec with 99% confidence. This
observation implies that the model is not simply matching
similar patterns in its input sequence. Instead, it learns the
necessary function prologue/epilogue signature and understands
the semantics of underlying instructions, e.g., by correctly
predicting local variable size 28 that the program intends to
allocate.
B. Attention Visualization
We visualize XDA’s internal attentions when predicting
masked bytes, which explains which input part the model
focuses on to make predictions [13], [60]. We use the example
of allocating local variables described in Section III to visualize
XDA’s attention in predicting the (masked) instruction of local
variable allocation. As XDA consists of 12 attention layers
14
pop	r15
40	55	57	41	56	41	57	48	83	ec	28	b8	...
sub	rsp,0x28
mov	r14d,r8d
push	r15
push	r14
add	rsp,0x28 pop	r14
pop	rdi
push	rbp
push	rdi
mov	r15,rcx
Prologue
Epilogue
Masked
...	8b	e9	45	8b	f0	48	8b	fa	4c	8b	f9	...
...	48	83	c4	28	41	5f	41	5e	5f	5d	c3
Fig. 13. The byte sequence example shown in Figure 3 with more bytes in
the context. We illustrate the attention distribution of XDA when predicting
the masked bytes (the instruction sub rsp,0x28). The darker the color, the
larger the attention value. We put the corresponding instructions beside the
most attended bytes.
with 12 attention heads (detailed in Section V-A), we take the
summation from all layers and attention heads.
Figure 13 shows XDA’s attention distribution when pre-
dicting the masked bytes 48 83 ec 28. We find that XDA
focuses the most on the hints from the prologue and epilogue.
For example, it notices (with high attention value) the typi-
cal argument passing instructions (push rdi; push r14;
push r14; push r15;) before the masked bytes, which
strongly indicates the following instruction should be decreasing
stack pointer (sub rsp,-) for local variable allocation. Then
it focuses on the last two bytes (c4 28) in the instruction add
rsp, 0x28, which increases the stack pointer to free the local
variable. These two bytes provides the necessary information to
decide how many bytes to allocate in the masked instructions.
Moreover, it also pays attention to some other instructions (e.g.,
pop r15; pop r14; pop rdi;) in the epilogue. This
probably further validates that the masked instruction resides
within a function body, so that it should leverage the bytes
c4 28 in the epilogue to predict the masked ec 28. Again,
note that all instruction, prologue and epilogue information
are provided by us for explanation purpose. XDA does not
have access to such information but plain bytes. However, the
attention visualization strongly implies that XDA implicitly
learns all such knowledge.
IX. RELATED WORK
Besides works described in Sections I and II, this section
discusses a more comprehensive list of related research papers.
Learned disassembly. Statistical learning has long been used
for disassembling and binary analysis [7], [46], [48]. One major
path most ML-based approaches take to boost the accuracy is
to incorporate the program semantics. For example, Wartell et
al. [59] leverage the statistical language modeling to capture
byte sequence semantics to compress the binaries. Shingled
Graph Disassembly [58] further employs graph-based learning
algorithm with cheaper training cost to distinguish code and
inline data. Other works [3], [36], [57] introduce control/data-
flow to improve the accuracy and robustness. XDA employs
masked LM as a pretraining step to automate learning semantics
and transfer to downstream disassembly tasks.
Applications based on disassembly. Disassembly serves as
the building block for many security-critical applications. For
example, binary rewriting and hardening [36], [62] aims to
improve the size, efficiency or security of binaries without
source code access, and rely on disassembly to recover functions
as building blocks for rewriting. Control-flow integrity [1], [37]
and code randomization defenses [61] aim to improve the
security of binaries by preventing the redirection of control-
flow and increasing the difficulty of code injection, respectively.
When source code is absent, which is often the case for legacy
software in most dire need of such protections, these defenses
can be retrofitted to binaries with the help of disassembly and
binary rewriting. Decompilation [11], [23] aims to automatically
reverse binaries to source code, and relies on disassembly as
an initial step to recovering higher-level structure abstracted
away during compilation.
Use of ML in other binary analysis tasks. Beyond disas-
sembly, ML has been increasingly applied in other binary
analysis tasks. For example, EKLAVYA [12] learns function
type signatures. DeepVSA [25] and RENN [38] learn memory
alias dependencies. DeepBinDiff [22] and GEMINI [63] learn
function similarity by neural embeddings. Most of these
methods are based on either recurrent networks or graph neural
nets that requires nontrivial engineering effort for encoding
domain knowledge, which are shown not as effective as XDA’s
underlying self-attention architecture in capturing long-range
dependencies, which is also fully-automated [54]. As shown
in Section VIII, XDA learns much broader knowledge useful
beyond the two tasks considered in this paper. Therefore, we
believe XDA has huge potential in other downstream binary
analysis tasks and plan to explore in the future work.
X. CONCLUSION
We have presented XDA, a novel disassembling technique
based on transfer learning. It leverages machine code semantics
learned in pretraining masked Language Modeling to solve
downstream disassembly tasks accurately, robustly, and effi-
ciently. XDA is 17.2% more accurate than the state-of-the-art
at recovering function boundaries, and achieves a 99.7% F1
score at recovering assembly instructions. Furthermore, XDA is
robust against various compilers, architectures, platforms, and
optimization levels. Our case studies have shown XDA’s po-
tential for a wide range of downstream disassembly and binary
analysis tasks beyond recovering functions and instructions.
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APPENDIX
A. XDA Hyperparameters
We describe the hyperparameters that we used throughout
all our experiments, if not mentioned elsewhere explicitly.
Network architecture. We use 12 self-attention layers with
each having 12 self-attention heads. The embedding dimension
is demb = 768. We set 3072 as the hidden layer size of MLP
fout (Equation 4) in the self attention layer. Overall, we have
roughly 110 million network parameters. We adopt GeLU [28],
known for addressing the problem of vanishing gradient, as
the activation function for XDA’s self-attention module. We
use the hyperbolic tangent (tanh) as the activation function in
finetuning MLP (Equation 2). We set the dropout [53] rate 0.1
for pretraining task while refrain from using dropout in the
finetuning task.
Pretraining and finetuning. We fix the largest input length
to be 512 and choose the batch size for both pretraining and
finetuning as 8. For pretraining we use the update frequency as
16, but for finetuning we set as 4. The update frequency 16 here
means the model will aggregate the gradient for 16 batches
before it updates the weight parameter. So pretraining has
16×8 = 128 effective batch size while finetuning has 4×8 = 32
effective batch size. We choose the smaller update frequency
for finetuning is because the training data of finetuning is larger
due to the extra labels (unlike pretraining where the data is
only input bytes). So we restrict loading too much batch size in
case running out of GPU memory. Consequently, to account for
the smaller effective batch size, we adopt a relatively smaller
learning rate as suggested by the common training tricks [24].
We pick 10−5 for finetuning while pretraining has a larger
learning rate 10−4 as its effective batch size is larger. Instead
of starting with the chosen learning rate at first epoch, we follow
the common practice of using small warmup learning rate at first
epoch. We use 10−7 as the initial warmup learning rate, which
gets gradually increased until it reaches the actual learning rate
after first epoch. Finally, we use use Adam optimizer, with
β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.98,  = 10−6, and weight decay 10−2.
In this paper, we adopt the hyperparameters that have
shown success in other domains such as sentence entailment in
natural language processing [17], [31]. For example, we stack
2-layer fully-connected network for finetuning tasks, because
finetuning is often assumed as a simple task as the sophisticated
dependency learning is offloaded to the pretraining. While it is
possible to search for better hyperparameter choices (e.g., more
layers or changing connections) from using manual trial [10] to
sophisticated algorithms [30], hyperparameter tuning in general
is known as an unsolved task. We thus leave the comprehensive
studies of tuning XDA’s hyperparameters in our future work.
B. Common Instructions
We include the most common instructions or byte sequences,
we include the top 5 n-grams of each dataset in Table X. We
choose n = 1, 2, 3 as most instruction types can be denoted
within these lengths of bytes [29]. We divide each dataset
by the instruction set, as x86 and x86-64 can have highly
different mapping rules of disassembling instructions. We
exclude the most common bytes in the results, such as cc
(padding bytes used to call to interrupt procedure), and 00 and
ff introduced in two’s complement (for addressing). There are
several interesting patterns emerge in the dataset. For example,
8b (MOV instruction) always ranks among the top. When 8b
appears in the 2-gram, the top-ranked is 8b 45 in x86, which
maps to MOV *, eax. While in x86-64, 48 appears the most,
which is the prefix that specifies the 64 bit operand. Therefore,
the top 2-gram in x86-64 is 48 8b, which indicates the MOV
instruction with 64-bit operand.
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TABLE X. MOST FREQUENT N-GRAMS (N=1,2,3) FOR EACH DATASET. WE OMIT THE CASES THAT INCLUDE PADDING CC , AND THE COMMON BYTES
INTRODUCED BY TWO’S COMPLEMENT FF AND 00.
x86 x86-64
1-gram count 2-gram count 3-gram count 1-gram count 2-gram count 3-gram count
SPEC
2017
8b 16,309,260 83 c4 4,055,543 83 c4 10 2,094,343 48 67,406,284 48 8b 23,456,799 20 20 20 3,217,114
83 11,315,789 44 24 2,747,236 8b 44 24 1,079,364 8b 35,597,922 48 89 14,122,963 48 8b 85 3,105,839
24 9,407,287 83 ec 2,568,435 83 ec 08 680,529 89 22,438,962 48 8d 7,953,318 48 8b 45 2,417,498
89 7,644,124 8b 45 2,332,870 89 44 24 633,151 24 17,730,247 44 24 4,730,699 48 89 c7 1,700,933
e8 7,036,366 c4 10 2,095,990 8b 45 08 592,854 85 14,285,564 48 83 4,475,293 8b 44 24 1,691,308
SPEC
2006
8b 4,411,454 83 c4 1,106,643 83 c4 10 616,278 48 9,048,147 48 8b 3,271,527 48 8b 45 383,183
83 3,036,396 83 ec 778,944 83 ec 0c 376,601 8b 5,226,813 48 89 2,224,299 8b 44 24 309780
08 2,112,428 8b 45 656,627 83 ec 08 198,326 89 3,690,654 44 24 868,788 48 89 c7 305,582
89 2,037,985 c4 10 616,663 8b 45 08 193,443 24 3,152,961 48 83 831,444 89 c7 e8 280,042
e8 2,014,742 44 24 470,326 8b 44 24 162,405 0f 2,995,076 48 8d 789,078 89 44 24 271,837
BAP
8b 4,859,036 44 24 1,428,109 c7 44 24 554,131 48 7,525,125 48 8b 2,881,802 48 8b 45 534,246
24 4,753,064 8b 45 1,007,213 89 44 24 474,436 8b 4,495,772 48 89 1,725,358 8b 44 24 233,303
89 3,503,718 24 04 572,253 44 24 04 385,919 89 3,055,089 48 83 703,937 89 44 24 214,676
08 2,034,947 c7 44 555,754 89 04 24 326,154 24 2,579,139 44 24 653,945 48 85 c0 185,531
04 1,919,547 54 24 518,124 8b 44 24 270,141 0f 1,799,445 8b 45 605,920 48 89 c7 180,814
TABLE XI. WE UPDATE THE RESULTS OF XDA IN TABLE II BY USING THE PRETRAINED MODEL ON all AVAILABLE DATASETS.
Dataset Platform ISA Recovering Function Boundaries F1 (%) Recovering Instructions F1 (%)
XDA Nucleus bi-RNN IDA Ghidra XDA bi-RNN IDA Ghidra objdump
SPEC
2017
Linux x86 98.4 55.4 79.9 91.8 89.0 99.9 87.1 95.9 94.6 100.0
†
x64 99.6 55.0 79.2 90.2 89.5 99.9 88.9 95.8 95.9 100.0†
Windows x86 99.9 60.8 73.8 67.6 70.4 99.3 82.3 96.7 92.1 99.3
x64 99.9 65.0 78.4 78.0 71.6 99.6 81.9 97.1 93.1 99.3
SPEC
2006
Linux x86 99.8 57.2 86.7 95.7 92.2 99.9 89.0 96.3 95.5 100.0
†
x64 99.9 56.8 73.8 92.8 92.0 99.9 85.9 96.4 94.9 100.0†
Windows x86 99.9 68.2 78.5 77.9 76.3 99.9 89.9 98.1 94.5 99.1
x64 99.9 56.8 72.7 90.1 86.2 99.5 86.2 97.9 95.7 99.4
BAP
Linux x86 99.6 61.5 74.1 59.0 57.2 N/A
∗ N/A∗ N/A∗ N/A∗ N/A∗
x64 99.7 53.5 79.0 58.3 56.5 N/A∗ N/A∗ N/A∗ N/A∗ N/A∗
Windows x86 99.5 69.0 80.1 89.9 87.0 N/A
∗ N/A∗ N/A∗ N/A∗ N/A∗
x64 99.9 70.0 81.4 90.5 80.6 N/A∗ N/A∗ N/A∗ N/A∗ N/A∗
Average 99.6 60.8 78.1 81.8 79.0 99.8 86.4 96.8 94.4 99.6
∗The BAP corpus does not contain source code and PDB files, which are necessary to obtain the assembly instruction ground truth.
†GCC does not generate inline data, so a simple linear disassembler can achieve 100% F1 score [4]. objdump always fails to identify inline data, but because
inline data makes up only a tiny fraction (<1%) of the code section, objdump’s overall F1 score is high.
C. Pretraining on all datasets
As described in Section VI, we always keep the data used
for pretraining, finetuning, and testing strictly separated, to
compare with other baselines fairly. However, as argued in
Section VII-E, we can always collect a large corpus of binaries
in the wild for pretraining, and always reuse the same pretrained
model for finetuning on different labeled datasets. Therefore, we
have also pretrained a single model using all datasets available
in Table I. We then re-run all finetuning experiments of Table II,
and include the updated results in Table XI.
Table XI shows that the average performance of XDA can
be further improved by 0.6% and 0.1% for recovering function
boundaries and assembly instructions, respectively. While in
such case, pretraining and finetuning data can overlap, note
that pretraining does not train with any labels (e.g., function
boundaries) but just raw bytes. Indeed, this is the common
practice in transfer learning [16], [17], [31], [44].
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